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I. INTRODUCTION
Foreign investment controls implemented by other nations have
been a matter of rising concern in the United States. In particular, the
United States has closely scrutinized Canadian controls on foreign in-
vestment because the economies of the countries are so intertwined.
Canada's Foreign Investment Review Act ("FIRA"),' which regu-
lated foreign investment in Canadian business, caused much conflict be-
tween the two nations prior to its repeal in 1985. The United States
objected to the Act because it restricted international economic develop-
ment,2 while individual investors voiced concern over the Act's extrater-
ritorial application.3 Further, Canadian courts extended FIRA's
reporting requirements to parent companies whose changes in control
had no direct effect on Canadian subsidiaries.4
Both internal and international pressure led Canada to replace
FIRA in 1985 with the Investment Canada Act ("ICA" or "Act"),5
which ostensibly lessened restrictions on international economic invest-
ment.6 Comparison of the two acts, however, suggests that substantive
change may be less than anticipated, particularly with respect to the
Act's extraterritorial application.7
The ICA, which purportedly liberalized review of foreign invest-
ment, in fact reaffirmed the Foreign Investment Review Agency's role in
reviewing extraterritorial transactions indirectly affecting control of Ca-
nadian business.' This Comment examines the policy implications of
FIRA's and ICA's extraterritorial application, and concludes that it is
unnecessary and counterproductive when direct control of Canadian
1 Act of December 12, 1973, ch. 46, 1973-74 Can. Stat. 620, amended by ch. 52, 1976-77 Can.
Stat. 1274 [hereinafter FIRA].
2 See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
3 See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
5 Act of June 20, 1985, ch. 20, 1985 Can. Stat. 419 [hereinafter ICA]. See infra notes 31-32 and
accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
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business is unchanged, or when contractual liability follows a direct
change of control.
II. FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW TO INVESTMENT CANADA:
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Canadians have been concerned with dependence on foreign invest-
ment almost since the country's birth.' United States investment, be-
cause of its overwhelming presence in the Canadian economy, has been
the focus of particular attention.10 Initial legislative efforts to control
foreign investment were directed at specific areas of the economy (for
example, banking and broadcasting).1 1 However, in 1970 the Cabinet
decided that more general legislation was needed, and asked Herbert
Gray to submit a report and proposals for legislation pertaining to the
control of foreign investment. 12 Gray's report 13 concluded that flexible
intervention on a case-by-case basis would effectively deal with the prob-
lem of foreign direct investment.1 This report provided the model
which led to enactment of FIRA in 1973.1'
A. The Foreign Investment Review Act
FIRA's stated purpose was that control of Canadian enterprises
would be acquired by non-Canadians only if significant benefit to Canada
9 Prime Minister Sir John A. Macdonald took care to ensure, shortly after Canadian confedera-
tion in 1867, that the Canadian Pacific Railway was built and operated by a company controlled by
British subjects rather than by United States citizens. See Donaldson & Jackson, The Foreign Invest-
ment Review Act: An Analysis of the Legislation, 53 CAN. B. REv. 171, 172 (1975).
10 At the time FIRA was passed (1973), the United States was responsible for 80% of foreign
investment in Canada. Fifty-eight percent of the manufacturing sector and 61% of the top 100
corporations in resource production and utilities were controlled by foreign entities. See Turner,
Canadian Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment, 23 HARV. INT'L L.J. 333, 336 n.16 (1983). See
also Howarth, Canadian Foreign Investment Review Policy, 1 B.U. INT'L L.J. 11, 16 (1982).
11 The Bank Act, S.C. 1964-65 ch. 40 §§ 3, 30, 38; The Broadcasting Act, S.C. 1967-68 ch. 25
§ 2(b). See generally Beck, Law and Policy in the Operation of Canada's Foreign Investment Review
Agency, 45 SASK. L. REV. 183, 184 (1981).
12 H. GRAY, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CANADA (1972). Gray was a minister without
portfolio. The first paragraph of the Gray report described the reason for Canada's concern over
foreign investment: "The degree of foreign ownership and control of economic activity is already
substantially higher in Canada than in any other industrialized country and is continuing to in-
crease." Beck, supra note 11, at 184.
13 See Howarth, supra note 10, at 12.
14 Foreign direct investment is defined as investment involving a significant measure of control
over the enterprise in question, as opposed to passive investment of the portfolio type. See Tennier,
Canada's Foreign Investment Review Act, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN CANADA 439,
441 (B. Fisher ed. 1983).
15 FIRA, supra note 1, § 2(1).
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was ensured. 16 Thus, FIRA enabled Canada to maintain effective con-
trol over its economy. FIRA established review of two types of transac-
tions: entry into Canada by a nonresident direct investor for the first
time, and entry into an unrelated business by a nonresident direct inves-
tor already carrying on another business in Canada. 17 Takeovers of Ca-
nadian businesses by nonresident investors were exempt from review if
the gross assets of the Canadian business did not exceed Can. $250,000
and gross revenues did not exceed Can. $3,000,000.18
Nonresident direct investors, termed "non-eligible persons" for pur-
poses of the Act, included foreign individuals, governments, and corpora-
tions.' 9 Corporations were presumed to be non-eligible persons,
regardless of the place of incorporation, if certain conditions were met.
If any individual non-eligible person owned 5% of a corporation's shares,
the corporation was also a non-eligible person. In addition, if 25% of the
shares of a publicly held corporation or 40% of the shares of a privately
held corporation were owned by one or more non-eligible persons,
20
those corporations were also non-eligible persons.
Non-eligible persons under FIRA were required to notify the For-
eign Investment Review Agency prior to acquiring control over a Cana-
dian business enterprise.2' Control was defined as 5% or more of the
voting rights of a publicly held corporation controlling the Canadian
business, or 20% or more of the voting rights of a privately held corpora-
16 FIRA's purpose was "to establish a means by which measures may be taken under the author-
ity of Parliament to ensure that.., control of Canadian business enterprises may be acquired by
persons other than Canadians, and new businesses may be established in Canada by persons, other
than Canadians... only if it has been assessed that the acquisition of control of those enterprises or
the establishment of those new businesses... is or is likely to be of significant benefit to Canada."
Id. § 2(1).
17 Id. § 2(l).
18 Id. § 5(l)(c).
19 FIRA defined non-eligible persons to include:
a. an individual who is neither a Canadian citizen nor a permanent resident . . . and
includes
i. a Canadian citizen who is not ordinarily resident in Canada and who is a member
of a class of persons prescribed by regulation for the purposes of this definition, and
ii. a permanent resident who has been ordinarily resident in Canada for more than
one year after the time at which he first became eligible to apply for Canadian
citizenship,
b. the government of a country other than Canada or of a political subdivision of a coun-
try other than Canada, or an agency of such a government; or
c. a corporation incorporated in Canada or elsewhere that is controlled, in any manner
that results in control in fact, whether directly through the ownership of shares or indirectly
through a trust, a contract, the ownership of shares of any other corporation or otherwise, by a
person described in paragraph (a) or (b) or by a group of persons any member of which is a
person described in paragraph (a) or (b).
Id. § 3(1).
20 Id. § 3(2).
21 Id. § 8(1).
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tion.22 Canadian business enterprises were defined to include both Cana-
dian businesses and Canadian branch businesses.
23
When a non-eligible person proposing to acquire control of a Cana-
dian business enterprise notified the Foreign Investment Review Agency,
the agency would often recommend specific actions leading to potentially
favorable review if the actions were included in the proposal.24 The Min-
ister of Industry, Trade and Commerce then reviewed the proposal to
determine if the investment was likely to be of "significant benefit to Can-
ada."25 General factors to be considered were the acquisition's effect on
the Canadian economy, as well as its effect on employment and competi-
tion within Canadian industries.26
The international community, and particularly the United States,
responded unfavorably to FIRA's implementation. The Act was viewed
as discriminatory and "inconsistent with open international investment
policies and obligations." 27 The United States, promoting an open world
trade policy, filed grievances under the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development Declaration of 197628 and the General
22 Id. § 3(3)(c).
23 Id. § 3(1). Canadian businesses included: 1) businesses carried on in Canada by Canadian
citizens or permanent residents; 2) corporations incorporated in Canada with one or more establish-
ments in Canada; or 3) any combinations of individuals or corporations, one of whom was a Cana-
dian business, who either alone or jointly or in concert with one or more other individuals or
corporations controlled or were in a position to control the conduct of the business. A Canadian
branch business was a business carried on in Canada, by a corporation incorporated elsewhere, that
maintained one or more establishments in Canada to which employees ordinarily reported for work.
24 Id. § 11. For a more complete discussion of the review process, see Beck, supra note 11, at
190-92.
25 FIRA, supra note 1, § 9.
26 The specific factors the Minister would look at included the following:
a. the effect of the acquisition or establishment on the level and nature of economic activ-
ity in Canada, including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the effect on employ-
ment, on resource processing, on utilization of parts, components and services produced in
Canada, and on exports from Canada;
b. the degree and significance of participation by Canadians in the business enterprise or
new business and in any industry or industries in Canada of which the business enterprise or
new business forms or would form a part;
c. the effect of the acquisition or establishment on productivity, industrial efficiency, tech-
nological development, product innovation and product variety in Canada;
d. the effect of the acquisition or establishment on competition within any industry or
industries in Canada; and
e. the compatibility of the acquisition or establishment with national industrial and eco-
nomic policies, taking into consideration industrial and economic policy objectives enunciated
by the government or legislature of any province likely to be significantly affected by the acqui-
sition or establishment.
Id. § 2(2).
27 Unger, United States Response to Canadian Foreign Investment Policies, 1 B.U. INT'L L.J. 19,
23 (1982).
28 Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development, Declaration on International In-
vestment and Multinational Enterprises (June 21, 1976)[hereinafter OECD Declaration]. The
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.29 In addition to objections based on its
impact on the operation of the free market, the United States also criti-
cized FIRA's extraterritorial operation. 30  Acquisition of control of one
foreign corporation by another foreign corporation triggered the review
process if control of the first corporation's Canadian subsidiary was ac-
quired in the process.
While extra-Canadian criticism of FIRA influenced its repeal, the
recession in the Canadian economy during the early 1980s sealed FIRA's
fate.31 Concerns over employment and economic growth superseded
OECD Declaration provides that member countries (which include the United States and Canada)
must grant to foreign-owned businesses from other member nations treatment no less favorable
under domestic laws, regulations, and administrative practices, than that accorded to domestic en-
terprises. Id. § II(1). However, rights of members to regulate the entry of foreign investment are
not restricted. Id. § 11(4). The United States claimed, nevertheless, that FIRA violated the "na-
tional treatment" provision. See Vagts, Canada's Foreign Investment Policy: An International Per-
spective, 1 B.U. INT'L L.J. 27, 30 (1982). Canada claimed protection under the foreign investment
review exception. Moreover, Canada had expressly reserved the right to enact measures affecting
foreign investment when it signed the OECD Declaration. Macdonald, Canadian Industrial Policy
Objectives and Article III of GA IT': National Ambitions and International Obligations, 6 CAN. BUS.
L.J. 385, 398 (1982). The issue was technically moot, however, because the OECD Declaration
relies on voluntary compliance by the member nations. The OECD is a forum for discussion of
international issues affecting trade. Its declarations are not treaties, and therefore are not legally
binding. However, such declarations are indicative of international custom. See Vagts, supra, at 29;
see also Macdonald, supra, at 399.
29 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3.
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]. GATT did contemplate a specific legal
obligation, providing that the products of contracting parties were to receive treatment on a par with
that of products of national origin. GAT provides that "[t]he products of the territory of any
contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treat-
ment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws,
regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation,
distribution or use." Id. art. 111(4). The United States brought a complaint to the Council of GATT,
claiming that the commitments Canada sought to extract from foreign investors violated Article III
of the agreement. See Arnett, From FIRA to Investment Canada, 24 ALBERTA L. REV. 1, 2 (1985)
(citing GATT PANEL REPORT, CANADA: ADMINISTRATION OF THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT RE-
VIEW ACT (L/5504) (1984)). The GATT council found that the solicitation of undertakings to
purchase Canadian goods under FIRA was inconsistent with Article 111(4) of GATT. Id. Canada
accommodated this holding by asking that applicants agree to give Canadian suppliers a "full and
fair opportunity to supply" rather than asking them to agree to give Canadian suppliers preferential
treatment, as had been the previous practice. Id. at 2. See also GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS
AND TRADE, GATT ACTIVITIES IN 1983 39-41, Sales No. GATT/1984-2 (1984).
30 See Howarth, supra note 10, at 17. Howarth, a commissioner of the Foreign Investment
Review Agency, described this as an extraterritorial "effect" of the law, rather than an extraterrito-
rial application of the law. He analogized it to the effects on the Canadian economy of monetary
policies pursued by the United States Federal Reserve Board. See also Unger, supra note 27, at 21
("FIRA review of mergers between United States parent companies that involve transfer of owner-
ship of a Canadian subsidiary has extraterritorial applicability and therefore the capacity to necessi-
tate a forced sale of a Canadian subsidiary by the acquiring United States company.").
31 Arnett, supra note 29, at 2.
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concerns over control of the Canadian economy by foreign investors.32
The election of a Progressive-Conservative government under Prime
Minister Brian Mulroney also helped secure FIRA's demise. The new
government was ideologically more sympathetic to free market principles
and maintaining strong ties with the United States than its predecessor.33
B. The Investment Canada Act
The ICA became Canada's foreign investment control statute34 by
replacing FIRA and the former law's emphasis on control of foreign in-
vestment. The new Act represented a change in philosophy, stressing
economic growth and employment in its purpose statement rather than
control of foreign investment.3 5
The ICA exempts certain transactions from review. When a new
Canadian business will be established, or when control over a Canadian
business will be acquired (formal review not being required),36 the In-
vestment Canada Agency (replacing the Foreign Investment Review
Agency) need only be notified. This ICA notification contrasts with
FIRA's complete review procedure for all new transactions, 37 and eases
the~burden on companies investing in Canada.
Foreign investments are subject to review under ICA when: 1) a
non-Canadian business acquires control; 2) a Canadian business with as-
sets greater than Can. $5,000,000 directly acquires control; or 3) a Cana-
dian business with assets greater than Can. $50,000,000 indirectly
acquires control a.3  The transaction is also reviewable if the foreign inves-
tor establishes or acquires control over a Canadian business related to
"Canada's cultural history or national identity," when such review is in
the public interest.3 9 Where control of an ongoing business is being ac-
quired, ICA's jurisdiction requirement based on a company's value is
much higher than FIRA's was.' Furthermore, almost all new busi-
nesses are now exempt from review, leading many to laud ICA as a more
32 Id.
33 Id. at 2-3.
34 ICA, supra note 5, § 46.
35 The specific language provides that the "purpose of this Act is to encourage investment in
Canada by Canadians and non-Canadians that contributes to economic growth and employment
opportunities and to provide for the review of significant investments in Canada by non-Canadians in
order to ensure such benefit to Canada." Id. § 2. But see FIRA, supra note 1, § 2(1).
36 ICA, supra note 5, § 11.
37 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
38 ICA, supra note 5, § 14; see Arnett, supra note 29, at 3.
39 ICA, supra note 5, § 15; see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
40 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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liberal regulation of foreign investment.41
Under ICA, non-Canadians are defined to include individuals, gov-
ernments or other entities that are not Canadian.42 Canadian is defined
to include: 1) a Canadian citizen; 2) a permanent resident; 3) the Cana-
dian government; or 4) an entity that is "Canadian-controlled" for pur-
poses of the Act.43 A complex series of escalating tests is used to
determine whether an entity is Canadian-controlled." Voting interest
(both equitable interest and voting control) 45 in the company is the main
criterion. This definition was developed to prevent circumvention of the
law through creative drafting of purchase agreements.46
Jurisdiction under the ICA lies when the non-Canadian entity gains
control of a Canadian business47 by acquiring control of a Canadian cor-
poration or business's voting shares or assets. A non-Canadian entity
can also fall under ICA jurisdiction even when there is no acquisition of
control of any corporation. Voting interest in a non-Canadian entity
controlling (directly or indirectly) an entity in Canada carrying on a Ca-
nadian business will trigger ICA's jurisdiction.4 Additionally, a non-
Canadian acquires control of a Canadian business by gaining "voting in-
41 See generally Arnett, supra note 29.
42 ICA, supra note 5, § 3.
43 Id.
44 The test for Canadian control is:
a. Where one Canadian or two or more members of a voting group who are Canadians
own a majority of the voting interests of an entity, it is a Canadian-controlled entity;
b. Where paragraph (a) does not apply and one non-Canadian or two or more members
of a voting group who are non-Canadians own a majority of the voting interests of an entity, it
is not a Canadian-controlled entity;
c. Where paragraphs (a) and (b) do not apply and a majority of the voting interests of an
entity are owned by Canadians and it can be established that the entity is not controlled in fact
through the ownership of its voting interests by one non-Canadian or by a voting group in
which a member or members who are non-Canadians own one-half or more of those voting
interests of the entity owned by the voting group, it is a Canadian controlled entity; and
d. Where paragraphs (a) to (e) do not apply and less than a majority of the voting inter-
ests of an entity are owned by Canadians, it is presumed not to be a Canadian controlled entity
unless the contrary can be established by showing that
i. the entity is controlled in fact through the ownership of its voting interests by one
Canadian or by a voting group in which a member or members who are Canadians own a
majority of those voting interests of the entity owned by the voting group, or
ii. in the case of an entity that is a corporation or limited partnership, the entity is
not controlled in fact through the ownership of its voting interests and two-thirds of the
members of its board of directors or, in the case of a limited partnership, two-thirds of its
general partners are Canadians.
Id. § 26(1).
45 Voting interest is defined under the Act to mean a voting share, which is defined as "a share in
the capital of a corporation to which is attached a voting right ordinarily exercisable at meetings of
shareholders ... and to which is ordinarily attached a right to receive a share of the profits, or to
share in the assets of the corporation on dissolution, or both." Id. § 3.
46 Arnett, supra note 29, at 7.
47 ICA, supra note 5, § 14.
48 Id. § 28(1).
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terests of an entity that controls, directly or indirectly, an entity in Can-
ada carrying on the Canadian business," subject to certain reservations. 49
ICA differs from FIRA both substantively and procedurally. Now,
many transactions are merely noticeable rather than reviewable.50 More
importantly, the standard for review is also different. Under FIRA, the
test for allowance was whether the proposed investment was likely to be
of "significant benefit to Canada."'" Under ICA, the investment need
only be of "net benefit to Canada."52 The factors to be considered in
determining whether an investment is of "net benefit" are identical to
those considered under FIRA, with the addition of one new considera-
tion: "the contribution of the investment to Canada's ability to compete
in world markets." 3 The Fallbridge Holdings case provides a useful
model with which to examine the differing operations of FIRA and ICA.
III. CANADA V. FALLBRIDGE HOLDINGS LTD.
A. Factual Background
In Canada v. Fallbridge Holdings Ltd., brought under FIRA, two
companies challenged the reviewability of a certain set of corporate
transactions involving changes in the ownership of several Canadian and
United States corporations." Under FIRA, the Federal Court of Appeal
of Canada ("Court of Appeal") held that the Foreign Investment Review
Agency had jurisdiction to review the transaction.1
6
Two companies jointly owned the Ambassador Bridge (connecting
Detroit, Michigan, and Windsor, Ontario). 7 Detroit International
Bridge Company ("DIBC"), a United States corporation, owned the
United States half of the bridge. 8 Central Transit Company ("CTC"), a
49 Id. § 28(l)(d). The reservations under this clause are unclear. They provide first that the
clause applies where there "is no acquisition of control... of a corporation incorporated elsewhere
than in Canada that controls ... an entity in Canada carrying on the Canadian business." The
second exception seemingly negates the first, because it provides that the clause applies "where there
is an acquisition of control described in [the first clause]." The reservations would seem to cover all
potential cases resulting in the primary clause being unconditional. Therefore, the language can be
interpreted to mean that acquisition of control under the statute occurs whenever voting interests of
an entity controlling the Canadian business are acquired.
50 See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
51 FIRA, supra note 1, § 9.
52 ICA, supra note 5, § 21.
53 Id. § 20. Compare FIRA, supra note I, § 9. For a more complete discussion of the proce-
dural differences between FIRA and ICA, see Arnett, supra note 29, at 24-33.
54 63 N.R. 17 (Fed. Ct. App. Can. 1985).
55 Id. at 17.
56 Id. at 28.
57 Id. at 18.
58 Id.
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Canadian corporation belonging to DIBC, owned the Canadian half of
the bridge. 9 Thus, the bridge was owned directly or indirectly by
United States companies. One quarter of DIBC was owned, in turn, by
Central Cartage Company ("CCC"), a United States corporation.6'
A two-stage transaction was proposed which would result in a CCC
subsidiary's owning the United States half of the bridge and Fallbridge
Holdings Ltd., a Canadian company, owning the Canadian half of the
bridge.61 Fallbridge initially acquired 24.9% of the outstanding shares of
DIBC.62  CCC continued to own 24.6% of DIBC.63  The remaining
50.5% of shares were widely held.' 4 Fallbridge bought its shares by pay-
ing Can. $7,579,200 borrowed from CCC,65 giving CCC a non-interest-
bearing promissory note payable on demand, secured by the purchased
shares.6 6 CCC borrowed the necessary funds from Toronto Dominion
Bank, tendering as security an assignment of the pledged shares and the
promissory note.6 7 CCC's part in financing Fallbridge's purchase was to
play a role in the subsequent court decision.68
After Fallbridge purchased the DIBC shares, the Foreign Invest-
ment Review Agency was informally notified of the transaction. 69 This
notification triggered the agency's formal demand that Fallbridge and
CCC give written notice of the investment in the manner prescribed by
FIRA. 7' Fallbridge filed the requested information, but contended that
its acquisition of CTC shares was not subject to review because Fall-
bridge was a Canadian corporation. 71 CCC rejected the agency's de-
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 19.
62 Id. at 18. A further agreement was signed with the following terms:
1. CCC was to sell to Fallbridge its 24.6% of DIBC's shares for ten million dollars, plus
an additional amount equal to the net current assets of CTC at the end of the month preceding
the month in which the shares would be sold.
2. To finance the purchase, McKinlay Transport Limited, a Canadian company wholly
owned by CCC, was to purchase 97,000 Class B nonvoting shares of Fallbridge for $9,700,000.
Fallbrook, Fallbridge's parent company, was to purchase 3000 Class A voting shares of Fallb-
ridge for $300,000. The balance was to be secured by a promissory note, payable on demand.
3. The share conditions of the Class B shares provided that they would be converted to
common voting shares subject to compliance with FIRA, if applicable.
Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 18.
65 Id. at 19.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 See infra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.





mand because as a United States company it was not within FIRA's
jurisdiction.72 The Federal Court of Canada Trial Division ("trial
court"), in response to the agency suit,73 enjoined Fallbridge and CCC
from direct or indirect action relative to CTC pending approval of the
investment pursuant to FIRA.74
B. The Trial Court Decision
The question before the trial court was whether the transaction con-
templated by the parties was reviewable under FIRA.75 CCC argued
that the investment was not reviewable because there was no acquisition
of control of a "Canadian business enterprise" by a "non-eligible per-
son." 76 According to CCC, the relevant transaction to be considered was
the purchase by Fallbridge of 24.9% of DIBC's shares.77 Fallbridge, as a
Canadian corporation, was not a "non-eligible person." '78 Therefore, its
purchase of the shares could only be reviewed if Fallbridge was a part of
a "group of persons any member of which is a non-eligible person."
79
CCC argued that its agreement with Fafibridge did not constitute group
action.80 Instead, it involved a divestiture of the investment of a non-
eligible person (DIBC) so that an eligible person (Fallbridge) would own
the Canadian half of the bridge.81 The trial court ruled that Fallbridge
and CCC acted in concert in acquiring effective control of CTC, and that
the concerted action constituted group action for purposes of the
statute.
82
C. The Court of Appeal Decision
The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision and its ra-
tionale.83 The Court of Appeal considered a number of factors, including
the fact that CCC developed the plan and arranged for its financing.84
The transaction involved greater than 20% of the shares carrying voting
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 21.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 24.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 23.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 24.
82 Id. at 25.
83 Id. at 26.
84 Id.
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rights, and therefore constituted "acquisition of control.""5 The Court of
Appeal also looked to CCC documents filed with the United States Se-
curities and Exchange Commission. According to those documents,
"[t]he Company... has determined to seek to acquire jointly with Fall-
bridge, such control of DIBC as will enable them to acquire ownership of
its assets."'8 6 The Court of Appeal's opinion stated that these documents,
and others with similar assertions, indicated the "group aspect" of the
dealings of the companies.87 Consequently, the Court of Appeal found
support for jurisdiction for purposes of review.88
D. Extraterritorial Application of the Act
The trial court's order explicitly stated that its exercise of jurisdic-
tion over CCC was not intended to operate extraterritorially. 89 Never-
theless, CCC argued in its appeal that the trial court's regulation of
CCC's activities was an extraterritorial application of FIRA and that
such extraterritorial application was not provided for in FIRA.90 The
Court of Appeal responded that there was no attempt to apply the Act
extraterritorially, but only to "regulate the acquisition of control of a
Canadian business by persons other than Canadians." 9 ' The Court relied
on Dow Jones & Co. v. Attorney General9 2 for this proposition. In Dow
Jones, the Court of Appeal held that the merger of RDI, Inc. (a United
States subsidiary of Dow Jones) with another United States company,
Richard D. Irwin, Inc. (which wholly owned a Canadian subsidiary, Ir-
win Dorsey Ltd.) triggered foreign investment review because control




88 Id. at 27.
89 The trial court said:
For greater certainty, this injunction is not intended to be an exercise of jurisdiction not pro-
vided for by the principles, laws and practice of private international law, and as a consequence
it is hereby expressly stated that this injunction recognizes and acknowledges the comity be-
tween this court and the courts of the State of Michigan and this injunction does not have any
effect so as to infringe the authority of the courts of the state of Michigan, and does not have
extra-territorial effect, so that in respect of the respondent Central Cartage Company specifi-
cally, this injunction is not intended to have, and does not have, any extra-territorial operation,
but instead is confined to whatever jurisdiction this court may have over Central Cartage Com-
pany insofar as any of its activities are carried on in Canada or have an impact in Canada.
Id. at 21 (citing Order of Gibson, J. on June 19, 1979, in the trial court).
90 Id. at 27.
91 Id. The Court further stated that the purpose of the Act was to "ensure that an attempt to
change the control of a Canadian business enterprise is reviewable in Canada so that if it is proposed
that control leave Canada, it must be shown to be of significant benefit to Canada." Id.
92 122 D.L.R.3d 731 (Fed. Ct. App. Can. 1981).
93 Id. at 732.
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The Court of Appeal based its decision on language in FIRA providing
that control over a Canadian business enterprise could be acquired "by
the acquisition of shares of the corporation to which are attached voting
rights ordinarily exercisable at meetings of shareholders of the
corporation ....
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE FALLBRIDGE HOLDINGS DECISION
In Fallbridge Holdings, the Court of Appeal found that FIRA's pur-
pose was to ensure that attempts to change the control of Canadian busi-
nesses would be reviewable. Significant benefit to Canada would thus
have to be demonstrated before control could pass to non-Canadian
hands.9 5 However, the court failed to explain how the statute's purpose
would be served by the exercise of jurisdiction in this case.96
DIBC, the United States corporation owning the United States side
of the bridge, effectively controlled CTC (the Canadian company owning
the Canadian side of the bridge) both before and after the transaction in
question.97 Corporations are recognized as legal entities in both Can-
ada98 and the United States, 99 and in FIRA itself."° Corporations may
enter into contracts and are the entities held liable for their breach. 1
Therefore, the Canadian interest in ensuring "benefits to Canada" while
CTC was under foreign control was well protected regardless of DIBC's
ultimate ownership."2 Canada's relationship with DIBC as a corporate
94 FIRA, supra note 1, § 3(3)(a)(i)(A).
95 Fallbridge Holdings, 63 N.R. at 27.
96 See generally Donaldson & Jackson, supra note 9, at 218 (review of extraterritorial transac-
tions involving internal corporate reorganizations is unnecessary in terms of the objectives of the
Act).
97 See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
98 See Canadian Corporations Act, 1970 R.S.C., ch. 32, § 16. The corporation has the power to
"enter into any arrangements with any government or authority... that may seem conducive to the
company's objects, or any of them, and to obtain from any such government or authority any rights,
privileges and concessions that the corporation may think it is desirable to obtain." See also Ed-
wards v. Blackmore, 42 D.L.R. 280, 286 (Ontario Sup. Ct. 1918)("a corporation at common law has,
as an incident given by law, the same power to contract, and subject to the same restrictions, that a
natural person has.").
99 See Greenbay & Minnesota R.RL v. Union Steamboat Co., 107 U.S. 98, 100 (1882)("The
charter of a corporation, read in connection with the general laws applicable to it, is the measure of
its powers, and a contract... [which] may fairly be regarded as incidental to the objects for which
the corporation is created, is not to be taken as prohibited."); see also W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS ch. 25, § 2564 (1979)("the power to contract in like
manner as a natural person need not be expressly conferred upon a corporation by its charter. It is
always implied, in the absence of express restrictions, subject to the qualification that the contract
must not be foreign to the purposes for which the corporation was created.").
100 FIRA, supra note 1, § 3(1).
101 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
102 See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
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entity would not be affected by changes in DIBC's ownership, because
DIBC's obligations to Canada rested with the corporation and not its
owners. 103
The court, in relying on Dow Jones to support its holding, ignored
important factual differences between Dow Jones and Fallbridge Hold-
ings. In Dow Jones, all of the property of Richard D. Irwin, Inc. (includ-
ing the voting shares of Irwin Dorsey, its Canadian subsidiary) became
the property of R.D.I., Inc., a United States subsidiary of Dow Jones.
Richard D. Irwin, Inc. surrendered its corporate charter and ceased to
operate as a corporate entity.1 4 Consequently, in Dow Jones the shares
of the Canadian corporation actually changed hands and the foreign cor-
porate entity which had been doing business in Canada ceased to exist.
Application of foreign investment review might have been justifiable on
that basis. 105 However, the transaction was characterized by the court as
a merger, 10 6 and consequently, liability under any agreement with Can-
ada would have been assumed by the new corporation. 107
Dow Jones is distinguishable from Fallbridge Holdings because the
shares of CTC in Fallbridge Holdings were owned by DIBC both before
and after the reviewed transaction. The Court based its decision in Fallb-
ridge Holdings on a derivative change of ownership which changed "con-
trol" of CTC, the Canadian corporation."° However, DIBC continued
to be the foreign corporation doing business in Canada, and no change in
that relationship would have been necessitated by the change in DIBC's
stock ownership. 109 Consequently, Canada had little reason to review
the transaction. The Fallbridge Holdings decision exemplified the con-
cerns expressed by foreign investors over extraterritorial application of
FIRA. Although the ICA attempted to make the foreign investment re-
view process more permissive, it failed to address investor's concerns re-
garding extraterritoriality.
103 Id.
104 Dow Jones, 122 D.L.R.3rd at 731-732.
105 Id. In point of fact, Richard D. Irwin, Inc. established control over Irwin Dorsey prior to
enactment of FIRA, and therefore was under no foreign investment agreement with Canada. Id.
106 Id. at 731.
107 See W. FLETCHER, supra note 99, ch. 61, § 7121 ("In case of a merger of one corporation into
another, where one of the corporations ceases to exist and the other corporation continues in exist-
ence, the latter corporation is liable for the ... contracts ... of the former.").
108 See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
109 See Donaldson & Jackson, supra note 9, at 226 ("In reviewing the legislative history of the
Act... we have concluded that the legislation was primarily designed to apply to changes in ulti-
mate defacto control of Canadian business enterprises and not with reorganizations.. . where there
is no change in the underlying control of the Canadian business enterprise.").
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V. CRITIQUE OF THE INVESTMENT CANADA ACT
The Investment Canada Act eliminated the concept of "group ac-
tion" involving a non-eligible person, on which the Fallbridge Holdings
decision turned. 110 Nevertheless, extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Act
continues to be a troublesome issue for changes in control of foreign cor-
porations with Canadian subsidiaries. The ICA rules for acquisition of
control'11 are ambiguous and may be interpreted to have the same effect
as FIRA with respect to extraterritorial jurisdiction.
The ICA does seek to address some of the issues of concern under
FIRA regarding extraterritorial application of the Act. The Act ex-
pressly provides that it does not apply to "acquisition of control of a
Canadian business by reason of amalgamation, a merger, a consolidation
or a corporate reorganization following which the ultimate direct or indi-
rect control in fact of the Canadian business, through the ownership of
voting interests, remains unchanged."' 2 This exception, standing alone,
goes too far in exempting certain transactions where Canadian interests
would not be fully protected, while failing to exempt transactions where
Canadian interests are secure. 113 For example, after a corporate reorgan-
ization in connection with a foreclosure, the contracts of the old com-
pany would not be binding on the new business, absent express or
implied agreement to honor such contracts.'14 Consequently, Canada
would not be able to enforce the predecessor corporation's agreement
against a new corporation." 5 Nevertheless, the transaction would be ex-
110 See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
111 Supra note 44, 49.
112 ICA, supra note 5, § 10(1)(e). These terms are not defined in the Act, but are defined in
BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY (5th Ed. 1979). An amalgamation is "a union of different corporations
to form a new body." A merger is "the absorption of one corporation into another." A consolida-
tion "extinguishes two or more corporations and creates a new body." A corporate reorganization is
"an adjustment made in the capital structure of a corporation in which old securities and indebted-
ness are retired and new securities and bonds are issued."
113 The review process under ICA may include submission by the non-Canadian investor of
"written undertakings to the majesty in right of Canada." ICA, supra note 5, § 19(c). These con-
tractual undertakings are enforceable in a court of law. See id. § 39(1)(e), 39(2), 40(2).
In the United States, where one company sells or otherwise transfers all of its assets to another
company, the second company is not accountable for the liabilities of the first except when: 1) the
purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to assume the debts; 2) the transaction constitutes a merger
or consolidation; 3) the purchasing corporation is a continuation of the selling corporation; or 4) the
transaction is entered into fraudulently for the purpose of escaping liability. Ladjevardian v.
Laidlaw-Coggeshall, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Therefore, liability of a United States
corporation under a contract would continue in the event of an amalgamation, merger, or consolida-
tion. However, liability would not necessarily follow in the event of a corporate reorganization. See
infra note 115 and accompanying text.
114 Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Ohio & Mississippi Ry., 142 U.S. 396, 407 (1892).
115 Id.
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empt from review under ICA.'
16
By contrast, ICA fails to exempt those corporate transactions where
indirect control of the Canadian corporation is acquired through means
other than those enumerated. For example, the direct purchase of 51%
of the shares of a foreign corporation with a Canadian subsidiary would
not qualify as an amalgamation, merger, consolidation, or corporate re-
organization. 1 ' Canadian interests would be well protected under such
a transaction, however, because the foreign corporation owning the Ca-
nadian subsidiary would continue to do business in Canada, and would
continue to have an enforceable agreement with the government."" Nev-
ertheless, foreign investment review of this transaction would be
required." 9
These illustrations demonstrate that Canada's interests would best
be protected by exempting only those changes in control (direct or indi-
rect) where the original corporation's agreement with Canada remains
enforceable. ICA's review of extraterritorial transactions which indi-
rectly affect Canadian business bears no rational relationship to the stat-
ute's purpose of "encouraging investment in Canada."' 2 °  On the
contrary, corporations will be loathe to invest in Canada, knowing that a
change in control of the corporation with no direct implications for the
Canadian branch of the business may trigger a long, complicated, and
costly review process.'
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF EXTRATERRITORIAL REVIEW
Established principles of international law and comity 122 govern the
extraterritorial application of a nation's laws. Comity has been charac-
terized as a question of "the wisdom of exercising jurisdiction."' 23 Na-
tions generally may exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction when conduct
116 See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
117 See id.
118 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
119 See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
120 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
121 See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
122 "Comity is a recognition which one nation extends within its own territory to the legislative,
executive, or judicial acts of another. It is not a rule of law, but one of practice, convenience and
expediency." Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir.
1971). See generally Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection between
Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280 (1982).
123 See, e.g., U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945); see also





outside their borders has effects within their borders. 24
A primary focus of debate regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction has
been United States antitrust law, which has often been applied extraterri-
torially. In antitrust cases, United States courts have interpreted comity
to require a balancing of the interests of the United States and the foreign
nation involved.' 25 In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,
126
the court established a "jurisdictional rule of reason."' 27 Determination
of the point at which "the interests of the United States are too weak and
the foreign harmony incentive for restraint too strong to justify an extra-
territorial assertion of jurisdiction" is required. 2 Criteria to be used to
determine that critical point have not been well articulated. In antitrust
litigation, criteria have generally turned on "direct and substantial" ef-
fects on United States commerce (also known as the "effects doc-
trine"). 129 In Timberlane, the court noted that the effects doctrine was
not dispositive of the conflicts of laws issue, and that a "more compre-
hensive inquiry was needed."' 30 The Court looked to the Restatement
(Second) of Foreign Relations Law, which advocated the consideration of
a number of factors in resolving jurisdictional issues between nations.'
3'
124 Maier, supra note 122, at 296. See also Gumpel, supra note 123, at 753-54 (characterizing
comity as "the prudential considerations that may motivate a court or prosecutor to defer volunta-
rily to the interests of another state or the international system.").
125 Maier, supra note 122, at 296.
126 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
127 Id. at 609. But see Kadish, Comity and the International Application of the Sherman Act:
Encouraging the Courts to Enter the Political Arena, 4 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 130 (1982).
128 Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 609.
129 Id. at 611. This direct and substantial effects doctrine has also been used by United States
courts considering the extraterritorial application of United States securities laws. See generally
Thomas, Extraterritorial Application of the United States Securities Laws: The Need for a Balanced
Policy, 7 J. CORP. L. 189, 192 (1982). The Fallbridge Holdings trial court decision implicitly en-
dorsed this "effects" doctrine in its decision. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
130 Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613.
131 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40
(1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)] provided that:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the rules they may
prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person, each state is required by inter-
national law to consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction,
in the light of such factors as
a. vital national interests of each of the states
b. the extent and nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would
impose upon the person
c. the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of another
state
d. the nationality of the person, and
e. the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be expected to
achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
For the assertion that § 40 requirements derive from a "rule of reason" analysis rather than being
grounded in international custom or convention, see Maler, supra note 122, at 294.
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The Timberlane Court identified the following as critical elements to be
weighed in the analysis:
[T]he degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or alle-
giance of the parties and the locations or principal places of business of
corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either state can be ex-
pected to achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects on the
United States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which there
is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability
of such effect, and the relative importance to the violations charged of con-
duct within the United States as compared with conduct abroad.
132
In Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.,133 the court utilized
the balancing process called for in Timberlane, and substantially adopted
its criteria. 134 The Mannington Mills court added several additional con-
siderations, including:
Availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there;...
Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and
grants relief; ... If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the
position of being forced to perform an act illegal in either country or be
under conflicting requirements by both countries; ... Whether an order for
relief would be acceptable in this country if made by the foreign nation
under similar circumstances;... Whether a treaty with the affected nations
has addressed the issue.
135
A similar analysis to that used in Mannington Mills should be em-
ployed by Canadian courts in determining the wisdom of exercising ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction in foreign investment review cases.13 6 An initial
matter for consideration would be the degree of conflict between the Ca-
nadian statute and United States law. United States statutes and policy
have consistently favored an open trade policy.137 Application of FIRA
extraterritorially in the United States has exacerbated United States con-
flicts with Canada with respect to open trade.
138
Although at present there is no United States statute directly con-
132 Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614. Cf. RESTATEMENT, supra note 131, § 40; see also Note, The Use
of Interest Analysis in the Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust Law, 16 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 147 (1983); Thomas, supra note 129, at 193.
133 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
134 Id. at 1297.
135 Id. (footnote omitted).
136 Though the trial court in Fallbridge Holdings claimed not to be exercising extraterritorial
jurisdiction, the matter being reviewed was the purchase by a Canadian corporation of a United
States corporation's shares. Compare supra note 89 and accompanying text (the trial court's state-
ment regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction in this matter) with supra notes 90-95 and accompanying
text (discussion of the decision of the Court of Appeal).
137 For discussion of the United States position on FIRA, see supra notes 28-30 and accompany-
ing text.
138 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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flicting with ICA, it seems clear that further extraterritorial application
of the statute could lead the United States to consider the passage of
"blocking legislation."' 139 Blocking statutes in the United States or else-
where might lead to multiple inconsistent demands on corporations. 40
For example, if the United States passed a statute requiring United States
corporations investing outside the United States to "buy American,"
while Canada required the same corporation to "buy Canadian," the cor-
poration would be placed in an impossible situation. Such inconsistent
demands could be minimized by limiting jurisdiction to transactions oc-
curring within the respective countries, absent compelling reasons to ex-
tend jurisdiction outside the nation.
Canadian courts also need to consider the benefits expected to be
derived from the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The ICA's pur-
pose is not advanced by exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction when Ca-
nadian interests are protected by contracting with the immediate parent
of the Canadian corporation, and the contract is not affected by the
transaction. Further, overly broad foreign investment controls may act
as a disincentive to foreign investment in Canada, an effect which would
be directly opposed to the Act's stated purpose."'
VII. CONCLUSION
Canada clearly has a legitimate interest in regulating foreign invest-
ment within its boundaries. However, Canadian attempts to regulate ex-
traterritorial transactions risk thwarting the very purpose that the
Investment Canada Act was intended to further. Review of extraterrito-
rial transactions does little to ensure that foreign investment will benefit
Canada. Most of the corporations affected will already have a formal
139 Several foreign nations, in response to the extraterritorial application of United States anti-
trust law, have passed legislation blocking the exercise of United States jurisdiction in their coun-
tries. See generally Foer, International Implications of Section 7 Enforcement, 50 ANTrrRusr L.J.
819 (1982).
140 For example, the Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11 (U.K.), permits recovery of
the part of multiple damages exceeding compensatory damages awarded by an overseas court for
antitrust violations by persons or corporations from the United Kingdom, while United States law
permits treble damages for antitrust violations. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982).
141 Analogously, concerns have often been voiced regarding the effects of overly broad United
States Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") reporting requirements for foreign issuers.
See, eg., Note, Foreign Securities: Integration and Disclosure Under the Securities and Exchange
Acts, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 911, 924 (1983)(overly broad SEC reporting requirements result in
"reduced international flow of capital and decreased investment opportunities in the United
States."); see also Thomas, supra note 129, at 190 ("Application of domestic laws to foreign securi-
ties transactions (where foreign countries may have substantial interest in the transactions, and dif-
fering regulatory practices and national policies), may create antagonism and ... ultimately may
impede the free flow of capital and affect world commerce.").
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 8:436(1987)
agreement with Canada specifying the benefits that the corporation will
provide to the nation. Imposition of an unduly burdensome regulatory
scheme may have the effect of discouraging future foreign investment in
the country. In sum, the purposes of the foreign investment statute
would best be effectuated by imposing review on extraterritorial transac-
tions only when direct ownership of the Canadian business changes, and
contractual liability under the foreign investment agreement does not
pass to the new owner.
Kathleen M. O'Laughlin
